UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

10-1-2012

State v. Martinez Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39440

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Martinez Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39440" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3846.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3846

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA
OF IDAHO,

)

COP

)
Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)

VS.

)

SASHA MARTINEZ,

)
)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

39440

)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

HONORABLE JON J. SHINDURLING
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

BRIAN R. DICKSON
State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703

(208) 334-2712

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF·RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT -APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ................... 1
ISSUES .......................................................................................................... 2
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 3
I.

II.

III.

Martinez Has Failed To Request Reversal Of Existing
Controlling Authority That Forecloses Her Argument For
Confrontation Rights At Sentencing ........................................... 3
A.

Introduction ...................................................................... 3

B.

Standard Of Review ....................................................... .4

C.

Controlling Authority Holds That There Is No
Confrontation Right At Sentencing .................................. 5

The District Court Did Not Unduly Restrict The
Presentation Of Evidence At Sentencing ................................... 6
A.

Introduction ...................................................................... 6

B.

Standard Of Review ........................................................ 8

C.

Martinez Has Failed To Show That The
District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Denying Her Motion To Re-Open The
Presentation Of Evidence At Sentencing ......................... 8

The District Court Did Not Unduly Restrict The
Presentation Of Evidence At The Hearing On
Martinez's Motion For Reconsideration .................................... 10
A.

Introduction .................................................................... 10

B.

Standard Of Review ...................................................... 10

Martinez Has Failed To Show That The
District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Denying Her Request To Present Testimony
From Her Mother ....................................................... 11
Has Martinez Failed To Show That The Cumulative
Error Doctrine Applies To His Case ......................................... 12
A.

Introduction ................................................................. 12

B.

Martinez Has Failed To Show That The
Cumulative Error Doctrine Applies ................................. 12

CONCLUSiON ............................................................................................. 14
CERTiFICATE OF SERVICE ....................................................................... 15

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Department of Labor and Indus. Servo V. East Idaho Mills, Inc.,
111 Idaho 137, 721 P.2d 736 (Ct. App. 1986) ............................................ 8
Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 803 P.2d 978 (1990) ............ .
Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738,9 P.3d 1204 (2000) ........ 9
Printcraft Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc.,
_Idaho _,283 P.3d 757 (2012) ......................................................... 8
Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 731 P.2d 192 (1986) ......................................... 5, 6
State v. Bayles, 131 Idaho 624,962 P.2d 395 (Ct. App. 1998) ........................... 12
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,825 P.2d 1081 (1991) ............................................ 5
State

V.

Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 30 P .3d 293 (2001) ................................ 11, 14

State V. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 43 P .3d 765 (2002) ................................................... 4
State V. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 77 P.3d 487 (Ct. App. 2003) .......................... 11
State v. Guerrero, 130 Idaho 311,940 P.2d 419 (Ct. App. 1997) ................... 5, 14
State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981,842 P.2d 660 (1992) ....................................... .4
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396,958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998) .......................... 12
State

V.

Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657,8 P.3d 652 (2000) ...................................... .4

State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445,872 P.2d 708 (1994) ...................................... 12
State

V.

Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 871 P.2d 801 (1994) ......................................... .4

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,245 P.3d 961 (2010) ........................................... 13
State V. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 30 P.3d 290 (2001) .......................................... 10
State V. Urias, 123 Idaho 751,852 P.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1993) ............................. 11

iii

State v. Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945, 277 P .3d 392 (Ct. App. 2012) ....................... 13
=~...:......;;...~.:::..;:...::.:~

120 Idaho 559,817 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1991) ..................... 5

.!...!...!!.=.!.-=-..::..!.-!...!.:::::...!.!.-...:....::::.!..!.!'

337 U.S. 241 (1949) .......................................................... 5

RULES
I.C.R. 35 .............................................................................................................. 11

iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Sasha Martinez appeals

judgment and sentence for robbery.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Martinez participated with Enrique Espinoza and at least one other woman
in the armed robbery of an Idaho Fails Common Cents convenience store. (PSI,
pp. 2-3.) The robbers, two women armed with knives and one man (Espinoza)
armed with a bat entered the store, threatened store employees, destroyed
property, and stole $120 in cash and $254 worth of cigarettes. (Id.) Although it
was disputed whether Martinez was one of two armed women who entered the
store with Espinoza, it was undisputed that Martinez entered the store to disable
the security recording device in anticipation of the robbery. (PSI, pp. 3-4.) The
state charged Martinez with one count of robbery, to which Martinez pled guilty.
(R., pp. 22-23, 30-35; 4/7/11 Tr., p. 5, L. 10 - p. 6, L. 21; p. 11, Ls. 9-17.)

The district court sentenced Martinez to fifteen years with three years
determinate and retained jurisdiction for 365 days. (R., pp. 38-39,49-52; 5/26/11
Tr., p. 67, L. 23 - p. 68, L. 13.) The district court relinquished jurisdiction less
than four months later. (R., p. 59.) Martinez moved for reconsideration (R., pp.
60-73), which the district court denied (R., pp. 74-76).
notice of appeal. (R., pp. 79-81.)

1

Martinez filed a timely

ISSUES
states the issues on appeal as:
1.

VVhether the district court erroneously permitted Mr.
Espinoza's statement to be read into the record without
affording Ms. Martinez the opportunity to confront Mr.
Espinoza or present rebuttal evidence.

2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by improperly
limiting the evidence available, both at the sentencing
hearing and the Rule 35 hearing.

3.

Whether the district court's numerous errors entitle Ms.
Martinez to relief pursuant to the cumulative error doctrine.

(Appellant's brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Martinez argues for a confrontation right at sentencing without
acknowledging controlling authority against her position. Must Martinez's
argument be rejected because she has failed to request that controlling
authority be overruled?

2.

Has Martinez failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it
denied Martinez's request to re-open the defense's presentation to allow
for a third co-defendant to address the prosecution's sentencing
argument?

3.

Has Martinez failed to show reversible error in the district court's refusal to
allow Martinez to call her mother to make a statement during the hearing
on Martinez's motion for reconsideration of the order relinquishing
jurisdiction?

4.

Does Martinez's cumulative error claim fail because the cumUlative error
doctrine does not apply at sentencing? In the alternative, has Martinez
failed to show cumulative error?
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ARGUMENT

L
Martinez Has Failed To Request Reversal Of Existing Controlling Authority That
Forecloses Her Argument For Confrontation Rights At Sentencing
Introduction
At sentencing, Martinez's trial counsel relied upon her statement to police
to try and downplay her role in the robberies and claim
was the driving force behind the crime. (5/26/11

, p.

it was Espinoza who
Ls. 3-23; p. 36, Ls. 9-

24; p. 43, L. 1 - p. 44, L. 6.) He asserted that Martinez did not initially tell the
police what happened because Espinoza told her not to, then Espinoza "spilled
his guts trying to blame most of this on her, as though she were the instigator in

it." (5/26/11 Tr., p. 43, Ls. 14-18.) Counsel asserted Espinoza thereafter wrote
Martinez a letter saying, "You can tell what happened. I don't care." (5/26/11 Tr.,
p. 43, Ls. 16-20.) In rebuttal, the prosecutor read Espinoza's statement of events
surrounding the robbery. (5/26/11 Tr., p. 51, L. 23 - p. 55, L. 24.1)
As the prosecutor read Espinoza's statement the defense made two
objections.

Initially the objection was: "This is a statement he has written."

(5/26/11 Tr., p. 52, Ls. 13-14.)

The district court, apparently interpreting the

objection as based on hearsay, denied this objection on the grounds that the
rules of evidence did not apply at sentencing.

(5/26/11 Tr., p. 52, Ls. 15-18.)

Shortly thereafter the objection was that counsel had "no chance" to "cross-

The statement as read by the prosecutor closely parallels the account of
Espinoza's statement contained in the police reports attached to the PSI.
(Compare 5/26/11 Tr., p. 52, L. 10 - p. 55, L. 21 with 2/28/11 Case Summary
Report, pp. 10-11 (attached to PSI).)
1
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(5/26/11 Tr., p. 53, Ls. 21-24.) The district court denied this
ground that it was part of
on in argument. (5/26/11 Tr., p.

same statement that defense

L. 25-

,L.11.)

On appeal, Espinoza argues the district court erred because the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment applies at sentencing and
because due process requires cross-examination. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-13.)
Espinoza fails, however, to recognize, much less argue for the reversal of,
controlling precedent holding that there is no confrontation right at sentencing.
Having failed to show that controlling authority should be overruled, she has
failed to state a viable claim of error.

B.

Standard Of Review
Idaho jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedent. The rule of

stare decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed "unless it is
manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy
continued injustice." State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002);
State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting
Houghrand Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990));
see also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992)
("[P]rior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are manifestly wrong
or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise."); State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho
384,

38~,

871 P.2d 801, 805 (1994) ("Having previously decided this question,

and being presented with no new basis upon which to consider the issue, [the

4

Court

guided by

res:sea in
P.2d

C.

1, 1

principle of stare decisis to adhere

the

as

earlier opinions."); State v. Card, 121 Idaho
108 (1991) (McDevitt, J., specially concurring).

Authoritv Holds That There Is No Confrontation Right At

"[T]he sixth amendment to the United States Constitution does not
that a [criminal] defendant be afforded the opportunity to confront and crossexamine live witnesses in his sentencing proceedings." Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho
197,216,731 P.2d 192,211 (1986).

See also State v. Wolverton, 120 Idaho

559,563,817 P.2d 1083, 1087 (Ct. App. 1991) ("the sixth amendment does not
require that a defendant have the opportunity to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses in his sentencing proceedings"). Due process likewise does
not require live testimony subject to cross-examination at sentencing. Williams v.
New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1949).

The Idaho Court of Appeals has

previously found the same argument advocated by Martinez "unmeritorious."
State v. Guerrero, 130 Idaho 311, 312, 940 P.2d 419, 420 (Ct. App. 1997).
This case is indistinguishable from Sivak, in which the Idaho Supreme
Court held that the defendant did not have the right to have his co-defendant
testify live and be subject to cross-examination at sentencing. Sivak, 112 Idaho
at 214-15, 731 P.2d at 209-10. The Court reasoned that "the full disclosure of
information provided to a sentencer in a presentence report is sufficient to protect
a [criminal] defendant's interests.

He need not have the actual live witnesses

whose statements are contained in the report present at the sentencing hearing

5

so long as he is afforded
those statements

opportunity to explain and to argue the veracity of

the

judge." kL at 215, 731

Controlling precedents

210.

there is no confrontation right

sentencing and that due process is satisfied where the defendant has the
opportunity to address statements in the PSI.

These precedents foreclose

Martinez's argument that the Confrontation Clause or due process requires the
presentation

of live witnesses

sentencing. Martinez's failure

subject to cross-examination

at criminal

acknowledge controlling precedent, much less

argue for its reversal, renders her argument meritless.

II.

The District Court Did Not Unduly Restrict The Presentation Of Evidence At
Sentencing

A.

Introduction
At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, when invited by the trial court,

the defense declined to call any witnesses. (5/25/11 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 9-11.) The
state presented one of the two victims, who gave a statement. (5/25/11 Tr., p. 7,
L. 12 - p. 9, L. 9.)

The district court then invited the defense to make its

sentencing argument. (5/25/11 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 10-12.)
Martinez's trial counsel argued that Martinez's history and mental health
were mitigating. (5/25/11 Tr., p. 9, L. 15 - p. 13, L. 6.) Counsel then claimed
Martinez had been accepted into mental health court. (5/25/11 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 711.) Both the trial court and the prosecutor indicated they had no record of any
acceptance into mental health court. (5/25/11 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 12-25.) The district
court set over the hearing until the next day to ascertain whether Martinez had
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been accepted into the mental health court. (5/25/11 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 13-14; p. 19,

L. 3.)

L. 19 - p.

The next day the district court found that Martinez had applied for mental
health court but had not been accepted because she was "found not to have
sufficient mental health needs or substance abuse needs to qualify for any of the
problem solving courts." (5/26/11 Tr., p. 28, L. 3 - p. 29, L. 5.)
Martinez's counsel presented argument that Martinez was a good
candidate for probation, addressing factors already covered the day before and
new factors.

(5/26/11 Tr., p. 29, L. 9 - p. 49, L. 15.) One of the arguments

counsel for Martinez presented was that Espinoza "controll[ed]," "manipulat[ed],"
and "pressur[ed]" Martinez into participating in the robbery. (5/26/11 Tr., p. 35, L.
2 - p. 36, L. 24; p. 43, L. 1 - p. 44, L. 6.) The prosecutor responded by arguing
for prison and not probation or retained jurisdiction. (5/26/11 Tr., p. 49, L. 20 - p.
56, L. 25.) As part of his argument the prosecutor read Espinoza's statement of
events to rebut the claim that Martinez was not a fully voluntary participant in the
robbery. (5/26/11 Tr., p. 52, L. 10 - p. 55, L. 24.)
After both sides presented their sentencing recommendations, Martinez's
counsel moved to reopen the presentation of evidence to present a witness to
rebut the statement read by the prosecutor, but the district court denied the
motion.

(5/26/11 Tr., p. 57, Ls. 2-13.)

Martinez then exercised her right of

allocution. (5/26/11 Tr., p. 57, L. 16 - p. 63, L. 20.)
On appeal Martinez claims the district court "erred by unduly restricting the
evidence in the record, and thus, unreasonably limited its discretion" by denying

7

the motion to reopen the presentation of evidence. (Appellant's brief,
record,

13.)

shows no abuse of discretion.

Standard Of Review
"The decision whether to reopen a case

receive additional evidence

before final judgment involves an exercise of discretion and will not be disturbed
absent a showing that such discretion was abused."

Printcraft Press, Inc. v.

Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., _Idaho _,283 P.3d 757, 774-75 (2012)

C.

Martinez Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Denying Her Motion To Re-Open The Presentation Of
Evidence At Sentencing
A court has "inherent power to regulate its calendar, to efficiently manage

the cases before it." Department of Labor and Indus. Servo

V.

East Idaho Mills,

Inc., 111 Idaho 137, 138-39, 721 P.2d 736, 737-38 (Ct. App. 1986) (internal
citations omitted). This inherent power must be weighed against the court's duty
to "do substantial justice."

JsL

When a party seeks to reopen to present evidence

"it must show some reasonable excuse, such as oversight, inability to produce

the evidence, or ignorance of the evidence." Printcraft Press, Inc., _

Idaho at

_ , 283 P.3d at 775 (internal quotations omitted).
Here, Martinez presented no reasonable excuse why she failed to present
testimony when the court invited the defense to present its sentencing evidence.
Martinez could have rebutted Espinoza's statement, paraphrased in the police
reports attached to the PSI (Case Summary Report (2/28/2011) pp. 10-11
(attached to PSI)), at that time. Apparently Martinez's counsel did not see fit to
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evidence until the prosecution specifically relied upon it at sentencing.
has failed to show any excusable neglect for why

did not

testimony when the court asked both sides to present any additional
evidence they wanted considered, she has failed

show an abuse of discretion.

Martinez points out that a "district court cannot unreasonably limit the
it considers when considering the appropriateness of a sentence."
(Appellant's brief, p. 13.) While it is certainly true that a district court may not
arbitrarily prevent the presentation of evidence, such does not mean that judges
have no control over the presentation of evidence at sentencing.
counsel waived the opportunity to present additional evidence.
7, Ls. 9-11.)

Martinez's

(5/25/11 Tr., p.

Whether to excuse that waiver and allow the defense the

opportunity to reopen the presentation of evidence was a matter of discretion.
Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 743-44, 9 P.3d 1204,
1209-10 (2000).

That discretion was not abused because there was already

more than ample evidence in the record by which to determine Martinez's role in
the robbery (see generally PSI), and because there was no excuse offered for
why the defense had not felt such evidence important enough to present until
after the state offered its sentencing recommendations. Martinez has failed to
show an abuse of discretion in the court's denial of her motion to reopen the
presentation of evidence at sentencing.
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III.

The District Court Did Not Unduly Restrict The Presentation Of Evidence At The
Hearing On Martinez's Motion For Reconsideration
Introduction
After a particularly bad review and request that jurisdiction

relinquished

early (APSI), the district court relinquished jurisdiction (R., p.

Martinez

moved for "reconsideration of the recommendation to relinquish jurisdiction." (R.,
p. 60.) With the motion Martinez submitted several document, including a letter
from Martinez's mother. (R., p. 71.) At the hearing Martinez moved to present
testimony from her mother but the district court denied that motion on the basis
that a hearing had been "held at the facility" and the court does not "do a new
evidentiary hearing" because a defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing
on the question of whether to relinquish jurisdiction. (10/20/11 Tr., p. 72, L. 22 p. 73, L. 7; p. 89, L. 18 - p. 90, L. 4.) The district court then took argument
(10/20/11 Tr., p. 73, L. 9 - p. 89, L. 2) and denied the motion (10/20/11 Tr., p. 90,
L. 4- p. 91, L. 21).

On appeal, Martinez contends the district court erred by "unduly restricting
the evidence in the record."

(Appellant's brief, p. 13.)

This argument fails

because Martinez has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion
by limiting the hearing to argument rather than holding an evidentiary hearing on
her Rule 35 motion.

B.

Standard Of Review
Both an order relinquishing jurisdiction and an order denying a Rule 35

motion are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135,
10

137, 30 P.3d 290,
motion is a

C.

). Whether to

testimony

of a Rule

I.C.R.

Martinez Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Denying Her Request To Present Testimony From Her
Mother
It is "clear that the defendant need not be given a

sentencing court prior

.,. before the

a court's decision on relinquishment of jurisdiction."

State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 264, 77 P.3d 487, 489 (Ct. App. 2003). See
also State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 30 P.3d 293 (2001). A Rule 35 motion
"shall be considered and determined by the court without the admission of
additional testimony and without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered by the
court in its discretion." LC.R. 35. "A Rule 35 hearing, if held, takes place after
the defendant has been accorded his right to be present at sentencing. Thus,
the sentencing judge may consider and decide the motion without any additional
testimony." State v. Urias, 123 Idaho 751, 755, 852 P.2d 503, 507 (Ct. App.
1993).
The district court had discretion whether to allow oral argument and
whether to allow the presentation of additional testimony.

I.C.R. 35.

That it

allowed the former and disallowed the latter does not show any abuse of
discretion.
Martinez argues that once a trial court has a hearing on a Rule 35 motion
"it is impermissible for the district court to limit the evidence presented at that
hearing." (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-16.) The very authority Martinez cites for this
proposition, however, specifically states that a "Rule 35 movant wishing to submit
11

additional evidence should make an 'offer of proof in the motion itself or by an
affidavit to enable the district judge
on whether to
appellate review

make a reasoned

an evidentiary hearing and to create a record upon which
be based." State v. Bayles, 131 Idaho 624,962 P.2d 395

(Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis original, quotations omitted).

Because neither

Martinez's motion nor the attachments thereto presented any offer of proof or
request to submit additional evidence (R., pp. 60-73) the district court did not err
by not conducting an evidentiary hearing on Martinez's Rule 35 motion.

IV.
Has Martinez Failed To Show That The Cumulative Error Doctrine Applies To His
Case

A.

Introduction
Martinez, acknowledging that the cumulative error doctrine is applied to

trial error, argues that the cumulative error doctrine should be expanded to
include sentencing and post-sentencing hearings. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-19.)
This argument is without merit.

B.

Martinez Has Failed To Show That The Cumulative Error Doctrine Applies
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in

themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.

State v.

Martinez, 125 Idaho 445,453,872 P.2d 708,716 (1994). A necessary predicate
to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error.
State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998).
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In addition,

cumulative error analysis does not include errors neither objected to nor
fundamental. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho
Martinez correctly acknowledges

P.3d 961, 982 (2010).
the cumulative error doctrine in
~,State

Idaho has only been applied in the context

a fair trial.

v. Whitaker,

152 Idaho 945, _ , 277 P.3d 392, 399

App. 2012) ("Under the doctrine

cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of themselves, may in the
aggregate show the absence of a fair

" (Emphasis added.)).

Martinez's

argument that the doctrine should be applied to sentencing issues in her case is
without merit.
First, there are no errors to cumulate. As set forth above, Martinez had no
right to confront or cross-examine persons presenting statements considered at
sentencing; had a full opportunity to present any evidence at sentencing that she
wished and was merely not excused from her waiver of that opportunity; and had
no due process right to an evidentiary hearing on her Rule 35 motion. Having
failed to show error to cumulate, Martinez has failed to show that the cumulative
error doctrine is applicable to her case.
Second, Martinez has failed to explain why the errors she claims occurred
at two different hearings should be cumulated. She claims she was denied a "fair
sentencing process" (Appellants brief, p. 19), but does not explain how this is so.
Certainly errors at the Rule 35 hearing could not have resulted in an unfair
sentencing hearing held months before. Likewise, Martinez has failed to show
that the alleged errors at the sentencing hearing were relevant to any issue in the
Rule 35 hearing such that they cumulatively show unfairness in that hearing.
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Finally, it is established
to
1

no

due process attached to the
reconsider. State v. Coassolo,

jurisdiction or

idaho 138, 30 P.3d 293 (2001).

there was never any due process

at issue in the Rule 35 hearing,

errors therein cannot cumulate into a

process violation. Likewise, it cannot

disputed that the process due in a

is greater than that due in sentencing.

See State v. Guerrero, 130 Idaho

311, 312, 940 P.2d 419, 420 (Ct. App. 1997) ("restrictive procedural and
evidentiary rules" applicable at trial not applicable at sentencing).
Martinez has failed to show that the cumulative error doctrine applies to
sentencing proceedings, at which less process is due than at trials. Any claim
the due process based cumulative error doctrine applies at post-sentencing
hearings at which there is no due process right at ail is even less persuasive.
Even if the doctrine were applicable generally, there are no errors to cumulate in
this case.

Martinez has therefore failed to show that the cumulative error

doctrine has any application.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment and order
denying the Rule 35 motion.

DATED this 1st day of October, 2012.
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